Threat Modeling
Project workbook · Path 88

Create a defensive threat model for a fictional document-upload workflow with assets, trust boundaries and prioritized mitigations.

The case

A fictional workshop portal lets an authenticated organizer upload a PDF and a reviewer approve it before public download. The design has a browser, application, private file store and public download endpoint. The exercise evaluates the design only; no exploit or live scan is performed.

AssetRequired property
Draft documentprivate before approval
Published fileintegrity and correct version
Organizer accountauthorized access
Review recordtraceable approval
STAGE 1

Define assets and boundaries

Start with the intended workflow and the assets that matter. Draw data flows and trust boundaries without assuming every component is equally trusted. Confidentiality, integrity and availability help frame consequences. Keep the model specific enough that a reviewer can trace a threat to an actual flow.

Your task

Draw the four components and mark draft versus public data.

Required output

Data-flow model

Record your result and evidence here or in a separate file.

Review gate

The private store is not treated as a public download directory.

If the gate is not met

Label each arrow with data and direction.

STAGE 2

Examine identity and authority

Authentication establishes an identity; authorization decides whether that identity may perform an action on a resource. Check upload, review and download separately. A role name alone does not prove enforcement. The case should include a question about whether one organizer can access another organizer’s draft.

Your task

Create an action-by-role matrix and three authorization questions.

Required output

Access assumptions

Record your result and evidence here or in a separate file.

Review gate

Every sensitive action has a server-side authorization requirement.

If the gate is not met

Avoid relying on a hidden button as the access control.

STAGE 3

Identify concrete failure scenarios

Write threats as a cause, an affected asset and a consequence. Examples include unapproved draft exposure, file-type confusion and replacement of an approved version. Keep the review defensive: describe the condition to prevent and evidence to request, without attempting attacks against a real portal.

Your task

Record six threats tied to the diagram and existing or proposed controls.

Required output

Threat register

Record your result and evidence here or in a separate file.

Review gate

Each threat references a component or flow and a specific consequence.

If the gate is not met

Replace generic hackers may attack statements with a bounded failure scenario.

STAGE 4

Prioritize proportionate controls

Prioritization combines impact, plausible exposure and uncertainty. Scores can organize discussion but should not imply precision unsupported by evidence. Assign owners and verification methods to mitigations. Distinguish a proposed control from one confirmed implemented and tested.

Your task

Prioritize three threats and write acceptance evidence for each mitigation.

Required output

Mitigation plan

Record your result and evidence here or in a separate file.

Review gate

No proposed control is marked verified.

If the gate is not met

Add a status and evidence link field to every control.

STAGE 5

Review residual risk

A threat model is a living design artifact. Record assumptions, open questions and the changes that would trigger review. A new public-sharing feature can alter the boundary even if the code change is small. The handoff should make unresolved risk visible rather than ending with an unsupported secure verdict.

Your task

Write a review summary and triggers for re-evaluation.

Required output

Threat-model handoff

Record your result and evidence here or in a separate file.

Review gate

The summary distinguishes design review from security testing.

If the gate is not met

List the unverified assumptions beside the recommendation.

Final project

Deliver the data-flow diagram, asset list, access matrix, six threats, three prioritized mitigations and review triggers. Add a public-share-link feature in a copy and identify which boundaries change.

Critical condition

The exercise stays within fictional defensive design and never claims that proposed controls were tested.

CriterionPointsEvidence
Evidence and correctness30Calculations, source use and results match the supplied case; limitations are honest.
Required artifacts30All five stage outputs and the capstone handoff are present and inspectable.
Reasoning and decisions20Choices, assumptions, alternatives and the case-specific critical condition are explained.
Reproducibility10A reviewer can follow the stated steps and distinguish expected from observed results.
Clear communication10Labels, units, structure and evidence references make the work easy to review.

Score at least 80/100, supply every required artifact, and satisfy the path-specific critical condition. Rework missing evidence before marking complete.

Worked reference

Draft confidentiality requires more than authentication: the application must authorize the requester for the specific draft, and the storage path must not bypass that decision. Approval must bind to a particular file version so later replacement cannot inherit stale approval.

Boundaries

This is a design threat model, not a penetration test, compliance certification or security guarantee.